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The 2017 General Election will likely be remembered as the campaign where the once 
dominant forms of TV and print journalism were challenged by digital platforms.  
This piece analyses this development while also acknowledging that social media 
networks do not operate in isolation from their more traditional counterparts and 
content is often shared between them.  That said, digital networks did provide Labour 
Party supporters with significant opportunities to challenge and rebut claims made by 
the Conservative- dominated press during this campaign.  A significant amount of this 
material focused on the merits (or not) of the two major rival parties and most 
especially their leaders.  In comparison, other politicians received considerably less 
attention than in 2015.   
The 2017 media campaign was not expected to showcase the kinds of 
innovation or generate the many surprises it subsequently provided. Its unexpected 
calling meant there was minimal time for campaign planning. In media terms, the 
rival platforms were often portrayed as though they were operating in parallel 
universes. So- called traditional media, especially newspapers, were seeking to appeal 
to older core voters and seen as relentlessly negative, anti-Jeremy Corbyn and pro-
Conservative. By contrast, social media was viewed as a vibrant sphere dominated by 
young, left-leaning voices with a heavily pro-Corbyn agenda. In the aftermath, it 
could be argued that 2017 marked a watershed moment, one where social media 
finally proved its electoral worth and the power of the press was significantly 
challenged. Intriguingly, the media election was not, however, solely characterized by 
innovation given it too would hark back to an era of two party politics. Thus the 
campaign proved to be a highly presidential affair dominated by both of the main 
parties and their leaders. These factors will be in turn considered in assessments of the 
role and nature of traditional, as well as social, media in this election. 
 
1. ‘Strong or Stable’? The Tories’ Communication Malfunction 
It came as a shock when, shortly after the UK had agreed to invoke Article 50 to leave 
to the EU, Theresa May reneged on her earlier promise and called the General 
Election for 8th June. Although a surprise, the Daily Mail welcomed this as an 
opportunity to ‘CRUSH THE SABOTEURS’, a reference to parliamentarians 
opposed to Brexit (Daily Mail, 2017a, p1). Unfortunately for May, the supportive 
media coverage and consistent polling leads she had enjoyed since entering Downing 
Street were about to come to a dramatic end. May’s limitations as a communicator 
were exposed during the election. Her apparent discomfort and even robotic style 
became self-evident in the way she repeatedly recited the party’s initial advertising 
strap-line ‘Strong (and) Stable Leadership in the National Interest’ during her opening 
campaign appearances. Later, forced to deny she had performed a ‘u-turn’ over her 
manifesto’s so-called ‘dementia tax’, the ‘Maybot’ was increasingly criticised by 
media commentators and satirists who recycled the ‘strong and stable’ phrase to mock 
her (Crace, 2017). The Prime Minister remained the overwhelmingly dominant face 
of her party in news coverage terms (Scammell, 2017).  
The two rivals for the premiership dominated reporting of this campaign 
(Table 13.1).  Significantly, in percentage terms the Tory leader featured twice as 
much in reporting of the election as her predecessor David Cameron had in 2015 
(Deacon et al., 2015). That Cameron had, like May this time, been the single most 
prominent politician two years before underlined the even more highly personalised, 
presidential nature of the 2017 campaign. 
 
 
Table 13.1: Most prominent politicians (TV and print news appearances) 
Rank Politician % items 
1 Theresa May (Con) 30.1% 
2 Jeremy Corbyn (Lab) 26.7% 
3 Tim Farron (Lib Dem) 6.8% 
4 Nicola Sturgeon (SNP) 3.7% 
5 Boris Johnson (Con) 3.6% 
6 John McDonnell (Lab) 3.4% 
7 Paul Nuttall (UKIP) 3.4% 
8 Amber Rudd (Con) 2.8% 
8 Diane Abbott (Lab) 2.8% 
10 Emily Thornberry (Lab) 1.8% 
Source:  Deacon et al., 2017a, p7. 
 
Despite her media prominence Theresa May refused to appear on live 
television alongside her rivals. Her strategists likely calculated that the Conservatives’ 
substantial lead in the polls meant the Prime Minister had little to gain from 
participating in face-to-face debates (Coleman, 2017). Although initially 
uncontroversial with most colleagues, May’s risk-averse decision might not have been 
so harmful to her reputation had other aspects of the ensuing Conservative campaign 
not proven so problematic. The Prime Minister explained her refusal to appear in 
leader debates was because she preferred to ‘get out and about and meet voters’ (BBC, 
2017). But this claim was visibly undermined when May was subsequently filmed 
knocking on a door and failing to elicit any response from the occupant. When the 
Prime Minister did spontaneously converse with a voter in Oxfordshire it proved an 
uncomfortable experience in which she listened to complaints about government 
funding cuts to disability care (Shaw, 2017). Both embarrassments highlighted the 
obvious limitations of interpersonal campaigning, not to mention May’s stated reason 
for not participating in a media opportunity that would have reached the largest 
possible audience of voters. 
May’s refusal to participate in face-to-face leader debates rendered her open to 
the charge she was seeking to avoid proper democratic scrutiny. This perception was 
reinforced by carefully controlled ‘public’ appearances in which she spoke in front of 
supporters holding Conservative placards. This now familiar, but somewhat staid 
format, was increasingly criticised by journalists keen to cross-examine politicians 
about live stories rather than passively listen to their pre-scripted messages (for an 
earlier critique of this see Oborne, 2005). This tension was palpable in the questioning 
of a seemingly panicked May about her so-called ‘dementia tax’ in what was intended 
to be another routine controlled appearance soon after the party’s manifesto launch. 
Elsewhere even straightforward queries from a local reporter in Plymouth were met 
with stock responses from the Prime Minister during an awkward interview where the 
journalist likened their encounter to ‘a postmodern version’ of popular BBC radio 
comedy programme Just A Minute (Blackledge, 2017).   
Once the Prime Minister’s credibility had been questioned, particularly over 
the Conservatives’ apparent manifesto ‘u-turn’, every aspect of her self-promotion 
was more readily challenged. Her appearance on supposedly ‘softer’ interview 
programmes did not necessarily convey the impression she might have hoped. On 
primetime BBC1 magazine style The One Show May and her husband Philip 
digressed into talking about who did the ‘boy jobs’ and ‘girl jobs’ at home. Similarly, 
when ITV journalist Julie Etchingham asked the Conservative leader what was the 
‘naughtiest’ thing she had done in her life, her surreal response was to admit to once 
running through a field of wheat when she was younger. The light-hearted 
questioning elicited responses that were further gifts for satirists and also offered a 
demonstration of how even the most seemingly innocuous queries could help 
undermine a politician’s image as a credible figure.   
 
2. For Many Audiences Not a Few Journalists:  Labour’s Media Strategy. 
There was a marked consensus among the expert ‘commentariat’ that Labour was 
on course for a major defeat in this election. The Financial Times’ political 
correspondent summed this up when he suggested: ‘One thing is certain: this is going 
to be a very bad election for a divided Labour Party and a weak Mr Corbyn’ (Payne, 
2017). The reasons for the impending landslide defeat were the supposedly ineffectual 
Jeremy Corbyn, the party’s ‘lurch to the left’ and its alleged lack of credibility on key 
issues. Corbyn’s leadership abilities had been constantly questioned since his 
elevation to the post and were once again challenged on ITV’s Good Morning Britain 
only hours before the election was announced. Interviewer Piers Morgan compared 
his guest to Arsene Wenger, the beleaguered manager of their favourite football team 
Arsenal, in suggesting he too might want to consider his position so that the team 
could recover and progress. The ensuing General Election would prove to both a 
liberating period, as well as a turning point for the Labour leader. 
The campaign Jeremy Corbyn led confounded expectations, particularly among 
his many critics in the media, which had even included Labour-leaning newspapers 
such as the Guardian and Mirror. As the election progressed they were the only 
dailies that supported the party, as Table 13.2 shows. The overwhelming majority of 
national newspaper coverage remained trenchantly hostile towards Labour, rather 
than favourable towards the Conservatives.  
 
 
 
Table 13.2: Political allegiance and circulation of daily national newspapers, 
May 2017 
Title Declaration 
Print 
Circulation Unique online browsers 
Daily Mirror Labour 0.65 5.41 
Daily Express Conservative 0.38 2.05 
Daily Star No declaration 0.43 1.02 
The Sun Conservative 1.58 4.96 
Daily Mail Conservative 1.44 15.37 
Daily Telegraph Conservative 0.48 4.78 
The Guardian Labour 0.15 8.47* 
The Times Conservative 0.46 Paywall 
I No declaration 0.27  6.58 (NB independent.co.uk) 
Financial Times Conservative 0.20 Paywall 
Sources: Mayhew, 2017a; Mayhew, 2017b; Ponsford, 2017. 
Note: *denotes figure for April 
 
This, however, temporarily changed during the hiatus over the ‘dementia tax’ when 
the focus of criticism briefly switched to the Tories, as Figure 13.1 demonstrates (see 
‘Week 3’). Nonetheless the overwhelming bulk of commentary in the press was 
negative rather than positive, and most of the negative was overwhelmingly directed 
at Labour.   
 
 
Source: Deacon et al., 2017b. 
 
 
Lurid headlines in right-wing newspapers depicted Corbyn and some of his 
colleagues as extremists with unacceptable views on terrorism, an issue that became 
highly salient during the campaign because of the heinous attacks on London and 
Manchester. The Sun (2017a; 10) used the testimony of a former Irish Republican 
paramilitary to accuse the Labour leader and Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell of 
being ‘IRA fanboys’ in the past. The Daily Mail similarly condemned Corbyn, 
McDonnell and Shadow Home Secretary Diane Abbott as ‘this troika’ of 
‘APOLOGISTS FOR TERROR’ on account of them allegedly ‘befriending Britain’s 
enemies’ (Daily Mail, 2017b, p1). On polling day, The Sun rehearsed many of the 
now familiar attacks with a front-page mock-up of the party leader and a plea to 
readers ‘DON’T CHUCK BRITAIN IN THE... COR-BIN’ alongside a ten point 
charge list that denounced him as a ‘TERRORIST FRIEND’, ‘ENEMY OF 
BUSINESS’ and ‘MARXIST EXTREMIST’ among other things. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly Labour strategists shunned most mainstream print journalism, with the 
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Figure 13.1: Weekly campaign press evaluations of 
parties (weighted by circulation) 
Cons Labour Lib Dem SNP UKIP
exception of friendlier publications such as those belonging to the Mirror Group 
(Waterson, 2017).  
Some of the negative stories in the print media about Corbyn also featured in 
broadcast coverage of the election. For instance, Sky News’ interviewer Sophy Ridge 
cross-examined Corbyn over his past involvement in Northern Irish politics prior to 
the peace process. This led to some tense exchanges during a campaign in which he 
appeared to gain confidence. Rather than passively accept journalists’ preconceived 
agendas, Labour also sought to shape the news and this was most amply demonstrated 
in the days following the two atrocities that temporarily suspended campaigning.   
Speaking after the Manchester bombing, Corbyn linked the outrage to foreign 
policy decisions he had previously opposed and now contended were destabilising the 
world. Similarly, following the London attack, Labour argued the government cuts 
would further hamper the ability of the police and public services to prevent and 
respond to similar incidents in the future. Far from being potentially damaging to a 
party depicted as being ‘soft’ on the issue, an increased prominence afforded to 
defence and security related news coverage (Figure 13.2) was met with a clear 
response from Corbyn. More predictably, Brexit was also an issue during the 
campaign, particularly at the beginning, but not the all-consuming some had predicted.  
 
Source: Deacon et al., 2017a, p16. 
 
The leaking of the Labour manifesto before its launch proved fortuitous given 
journalists spent more time discussing its contents than they might otherwise. This is 
not to say the party’s presentation of its policies was without incident. Corbyn’s 
record and plans were closely interrogated by a vocal group of voters, some highly 
critical, on the BBC1 Question Time Leaders’ Special, as well as Channel 4’s 
equivalent programme. Although he appeared resilient during these occasionally 
uncomfortable experiences, the party leader was not always able to readily respond. 
When asked on BBC Five Live about the cost implications of his ambitious plans for 
childcare on the day the policy was being promoted, Corbyn struggled to answer. 
Similarly, Diane Abbott was embarrassed during an interview with LBC radio in 
which she was unable to explain the amount of funding that would be needed to 
support an expansion in police numbers.   
High profile gaffes like those of Corbyn and Abbott contributed to a greater 
emphasis being placed on policy, at the expense of ‘process’ that typically dominated 
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Figure 13.2: Proportional prominence of campaign 
issues, week by week (TV and press)  
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election news; in 2017 this figure was at a third of all coverage, markedly down on its 
2015 equivalent (Deacon et al., 2017b). And although Labour appeared keen to 
campaign on substantive issues, Corbyn did emulate his Conservative opponent by 
appearing on The One Show where he seemed comfortable talking about his 
upbringing and hobbies. Unlike May, the Labour leader’s partner was not a fellow 
guest and nor did he talk much about his current family life. The popular appeal of 
Corbyn was perhaps most memorably captured in television footage of his tour of the 
country where he was met by enthusiasm (Parry, 2017). Facing a concert crowd in 
Wirral he was greeted by an apparently spontaneous chant of his name that would 
continue to be heard throughout the rest of the campaign and beyond.   
 
3. Finding their voices?  Coverage of the minor parties 
The growing confidence of the Labour campaign led Corbyn to make a surprise 
appearance in the final major face-to-face televised leaders’ debate. Previously he had 
said he would not participate without the Prime Minister also being involved. 
Although these kinds of live encounters are scrutinised for any perceived gaffes by 
those speaking, it was perhaps Theresa May’s decision to stay away that was more 
important than anything that happened on the night itself. The controversy over May’s 
no-show also gave Liberal Democrat leader Tim Farron one of his few opportunities 
to make an impression on the campaign. Using his closing remarks as the penultimate 
speaker, Farron rounded on May and the Home Secretary who was representing her: 
‘Amber Rudd is up next. She is not Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is not here so 
she can’t be bothered, so why should you. In fact Bake Off is on BBC2 next, why not 
make yourself a brew? You are not worth Theresa May’s time, don’t give her yours’ 
(Mortimer, 2017). Moreover, he urged viewers to change channels before the Prime 
Minister’s stand-in Amber Rudd made her final remarks.   
The Liberal Democrat leader’s bonhomie was in evidence when he showed 
himself to be open to scrutiny by engaging in conversation during a televised 
encounter with an irate Leave supporter. But Farron was less patient when the issue of 
whether his Christianity conflicted with party policy advocating gay equality was 
repeatedly brought up in media interviews. Similarly, when challenged over his 
support for a second EU referendum by the BBC’s lead interrogator Andrew Neil, 
their interview descended into a row. The Farron interview was one of a number Neil 
conducted with party leaders on behalf of the BBC. In his programme with Neil, 
UKIP’s Paul Nuttall was similarly discomforted when asked about inflammatory 
comments attacking Islam made by one of his fellow MEPs. Nuttall had been keen for 
positive public exposure due to the marked decline of news interest in his party that 
mirrored its collapse in the polls. UKIP also lost the support of the Express, the 
fiercely Eurosceptic newspaper that had been the only daily national newspaper to 
endorse it during the previous election.   
 
Source: Deacon et al. 2017b, p370. 
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 Having assumed a high profile in 2015, national news coverage of the SNP 
also substantially declined in this campaign, the reporting of which was now 
dominated by the two major parties as shown by Figure 133. Despite enjoying 
representation in the leaders’ debate, the Greens and Plaid Cymru were largely 
ignored by the media. But at least they, unlike the similarly marginalised DUP, had a 
place in the live UK-wide televised leaders’ programming. The Northern Irish party 
had protested its exclusion from this by broadcasters. Following the result and 
election of a hung parliament that gave them the balance of power, there was far 
greater coverage of the DUP than the tiny amount it had received in the preceding 
campaign (Deacon et al., 2017a).   
 
4. Parties and social media competition: The unexpected election? 
At the outset of the election, there was arguably less media interest in online 
campaigning than the previous four campaigns. The ubiquitous nature of Internet 
technologies meant their novelty value for journalists had worn off. Moreover, the 
seemingly pre-determined nature of the result did little to stimulate interest in the 
campaign. Rather than the usual hype around whether the Internet would swing it for 
one particular party, there were fears, following the US presidential election, of social 
media promoting fake news, abuse and a polarization of the electorate. Yet, as the 
campaign progressed, social media was highlighted as a significant factor in the 
unexpected rise in support for Labour. It was generally accepted, even by some 
Conservatives, that Labour won the 2017 social media battle and had been 
particularly successful at mobilizing young voter support.  
Social media has sometimes been viewed as a more open and less skewed 
communication playing field producing different patterns of competition and more 
accessibility for minority parties than mainstream media channels (Ward et al., 2018). 
At the previous 2015 election, there were mixed messages in terms of online 
campaign competition. Labour was seen as dominating the Twittersphere, whilst the 
Conservatives utilised negative advertising on Facebook. (Wring and Ward, 2015). 
2017 was somewhat different with Labour and Jeremy Corbyn seen as a dominant 
force across a range of platforms. Moreover, in-line with Labour’s rise in the opinion 
polls, Labour’s advantage appeared to increase over the course of the campaign. 
Labour maintained their dominant position on Twitter in terms of a range of basic 
measures such as followers, likes and shares (Bauchowitz and Hanska, 2017). Labour 
supporting hashtags and accounts outperformed the Conservatives. Similarly, when 
examining the most popular election hashtags, the Labour advantage was again 
underlined with groupings of both Labour and Corbyn hashtags appearing in the top 
six election terms. Whilst the Conservatives and May hashtags appear in 8/9th position, 
they were a long way distant in terms of numbers. By the last two weeks of the 
campaign, one study indicated that Labour’s dominance was increasing - Labour 
accounted for 61.9% of party related tweets during one week compared to just 17% 
for the Conservatives (Kaminska et al., 2017). 
Twitter also seemed to magnify the importance of party leaders and their personal 
accounts. Here again, Labour dominated with Corbyn’s account gaining by far the 
most mentions and retweets – twice as many as May and four times as much as 
official Labour and Conservative party accounts. Corbyn began with the campaign 
with over twice as many followers as May and extended this advantage during the 
campaign with a 45% increase (Cecil, 2017).  
Whilst Labour may have maintained and extended its advantage on Twitter, 
Facebook was seen as the key social media battleground for three main reasons: 
Firstly, it reaches a greater potential share of the electorate with well over half UK 
population now having Facebook accounts; Secondly, its demographic profile, 
although still skewed, is more diverse than other social media. Thirdly, Facebook 
offers the greatest potential in terms of data mining, profiling and then advertising and 
targeting. As with Twitter, Labour’s Facebook following grew substantially to close 
to a million over the course of the campaign; the number of likes grew by 75% 
compared to just 10% for Conservatives; Labour also had three-times as many 
Facebook shares.  
Use of other social media platforms appeared more-patchy. However, the 
Conservatives reportedly used paid advertising on a range of other outlets particularly 
YouTube. According to BBC reports though, these were more randomly distributed 
compared to the micro-targeting on Facebook. Snapchat, one of the most popular 
social media outlets amongst teenagers, was used fairly cautiously. The main party 
leaders and the co-leaders of the Green Party took part in a rather awkward Snapchat 
Q&A session. Labour latterly appealed to Snapchat users to turn out to vote, whilst 
the Conservatives experimented with paid content (BBC, 2017). 
Despite its reputation as being a more open media space for minority parties, few 
minor parties made much of an impact online in 2017. The eventual dominance of the 
two main parties in vote-share terms was reflected in many of the social media 
metrics. The increasing complexities and resource demands of data-driven marketing 
strategies clearly limit smaller parties’ ability to compete. But even in basic terms, the 
Liberal Democrats, for example, didn’t even appear in the top 20 election-hashtag 
groupings. Amongst the smaller parties, only the SNP and Nicola Sturgeon managed 
to register much of a presence across Twitter and Facebook in terms of following, 
discussion and sharing (Cram et al., 2017; Kaminska et al., 2017). 
Patterns of major party dominance were also seen in terms of candidate presence 
on the two main social media platforms. Overall, 68% candidates ran Twitter 
accounts with a similar number maintaining a Facebook presence. This masks slightly 
different underlying patterns. Labour had most candidates on Twitter with 88%, well 
ahead of the Conservatives, SNP and Liberal Democrats. On Facebook, SNP 
candidates had the largest presence followed by Labour. Other minor parties, however, 
lagged well behind with a 62% Facebook presence and only just over half their 
candidates being found on Twitter. Indeed, the UKIP Party Chairman was reported to 
have instructed candidates to close their own social media sites as he “hated social 
media” because it simply caused “more grief for the party” (www.order-order.com, 
2017).  
Whilst basic social media metrics such as followers, retweets and links are fairly 
crude measures of the importance or success of campaigns, this time most pointed in 
one direction. As one media report put it: “Labour tweeted more, posted more and 
shared more than all its rivals” (Bloomberg, 2017). 
 
5. Online Campaign Organisation: Networks, Movements and Sharing 
Over the past decade, two broad models of social media campaigning have 
attracted attention.  Firstly, a more decentralized, networked, citizen-led style of 
campaign (Gibson, 2013), tends to focus on social media’s participatory possibilities 
and where the actions of campaign activists/supporters determine the direction or 
focus of a campaign. Participatory acts and engagement are often at the heart of this 
approach. The second emergent model is that of data-driven or big-data campaigns 
(Anstead, 2017). Here the concentration is on the exploitation of data 
gathering/mining possibilities of social media to then target personalized marketing 
and advertising to key groups of voters in swing seats. The notion of data driven 
campaigning attracted attention at a number of recent elections and during the EU 
referendum campaign (Economist, 2017). However, the use of data and marketing in 
itself is not, of course, new, but the internet’s potential for information surveillance 
provides opportunities to drill down ever further into voter sentiment. 
In the 2017 campaign, superficially at least, the Conservatives appeared to lean 
towards a more data-driven, top-down approach. Labour with its newly reinvigorated 
party membership appeared to incorporate more of the citizen-led aspect. This may 
simply be a reflection of the respective parties’ current strengths and structures rather 
than any necessary strategic choice. Moreover, as noted below, Labour appeared to 
combine elements of both data-driven and supporter-enabled digital campaigning. 
Interestingly, this seems to have been reflected in Labour’s formal campaign 
organization. Andrew Gwynne, the campaign co-ordinator revealed that: 
we placed digital at the heart of our activities, with HQ teams organised 
into separate campaign and organisational arms. The former led on 
delivering the right message to the right voters, the latter on engagement 
and mobilization (Guardian, 2017). 
 
 
In the aftermath of the election, there has been considerable criticism both 
internally and externally of the Conservatives (digital) campaign. Critics have argued 
that it was too-controlled, too-negative, too-top-down (leader focused), inflexible and 
appeared to want simply replicate some of the 2015 campaign tactics. In short, the 
party forgot the social element to social media (Morgan, 2017; Mason, 2017). The 
Conservatives had, indeed, rehired many of same digital advisors from 2015 and 
much emphasis again was placed on micro-targeted ads via Facebook (Ruddick, 
2017). However, the messages failed to resonate and were much less likely to be 
shared. Social media analysts noted that whilst the approach was not necessarily 
wrong, the messages did not always match the targets (Booth and Hern, 2017). The 
over-confidence of the early part of the Conservative campaign meant that 
advertisements were often targeted towards soft Labour voters in marginal or even 
relatively safe Labour seats. Little emphasis was apparently placed on digital 
marketing in their own marginals. The ‘strong and stable’ mantra seemed to find little 
traction with the targeted swing voters, but might have had more impact on core 
Conservative supporters (Booth and Hern, 2017). Furthermore, the campaign did not 
appear very responsive even though the data reportedly coming into Conservative 
Headquarters in the latter part of the campaign suggested the strategy wasn’t working. 
The Conservative social media campaign, could arguably be encapsulated in MP Greg 
Knight’s much-ridiculed online video. His Alan Partridge-style performance saw him 
walk awkwardly into a bland office and woodenly deliver a banal message, rounded-
off with a 1970s style musical jingle (www.LBC.co.uk, 2017). Although, to be fair to 
Knight, this garnered over half a million views more than some of the messages put 
out by his party. 
Labour, by contrast, was viewed as having a more slick, flexible, and positive 
online campaign with sharing and mobilization at its heart (Walsh, 2017). This could 
be seen not just in the public metrics of followers, likes and shares, but also in their 
below the radar social media marketing. The party appeared to have learnt the lessons 
from 2015 where they had been massively outspent by Conservatives who 
successfully targeted negative attack adverts. This time Labour married both data 
targeting and marketing ads whilst also extensively encouraging grassroots 
engagement. They reportedly spent over £1m aiming to match the Conservatives in 
Facebook advertising assisted by a new digital tool “Promote” to produce targeted 
hyper-localized social media marketing (Wendling, 2017).   
Labour also allied themselves to so-called “influencers” with large existing 
social media audiences (Pringle, 2017). A range of celebrities from music, sport and 
television were used to endorse Labour’s message through videos and at campaign 
rallies which were then shared virally on social media. According to Buzzfeed 
analysis, these celebrity endorsements were amongst the most shared election related 
articles on Facebook. The support of specific types of celebrity such as Stormzy and 
rapper Akala were seen as boosting Corbyn’s anti-establishment image and reaching 
out to a younger audience. Crucially, however, the content and messages aimed to 
gain both clicks and encourage sharing. Labour placed considerable emphasis in this 
campaign on video content that was likely to be shared by friends (Segesten and 
Bossetta, 2017; Fletcher, 2017).     
Labour’s other main advantage in spreading its message was what Chadwick 
(2017) has referred to as the party-as-movement mentality. The surge in Labour 
membership post-2015 meant there was a ready army of digitally-skilled supporters. 
Yet, in the run up to election, doubts had been raised about how valuable an asset the 
newer members might be. Initial research on new Labour members suggested that 
they were Internet engaged, but were largely clicktivists distant from the party as 
whole (Poletti et al. 2016). There were grumbles from some local parties that the new 
Corbynite supporters were not interested in the hard work of the traditional doorstep 
campaign (Chakelian, 2017). Ultimately, though, such fears seem to have been 
misplaced. Labour’s official campaign, assisted by advisors from the Bernie Sanders 
grassroots US presidential bid, was heavily supported by new Corbyn-inspired activist 
networks, most notably Momentum. Formed initially to bolster Corbyn’s leadership 
position and battle-hardened from his recent leadership re-election campaign, 
Momentum provided both online resources and ground-level co-ordination that other 
parties lacked. They helped launch online tools such as My Nearest Marginal, 
allowing supporters to find their nearest swing seat and join with other activists 
(Shabi, 2017). Phone canvassing apps were also deployed along with the traditional 
door-knocking days. Momentum claimed that a quarter of all UK Facebook users saw 
Momentum videos in the last week of the campaign. Much of this was done at low 
cost with Momentum capitalising on volunteer skills and allowing individual 
supporters to create DIY campaign material.  
Additionally, Labour also benefited from having its message amplified through 
the growth of leftist social media news sites such as The Canary, Evolve Politics and 
Paul Mason News, who were also able to gain considerable shares online and 
motivate left-leaning activists. To some extent, supporter networks and social media 
sites enabled Labour to bypass and to counter negativity of mainstream (‘MSM’) 
outlets (Al-Kadhi, 2017; Littunen, 2017). 
 
6. The Impact of the Social Media Campaign 
Previous UK election campaigns have usually begun with an overhyping of 
technology and ended with disappointment about its limited impact. The 2017 
campaign followed a somewhat different pattern with less initial hype followed by an 
assumption that social media made a significant impact in two ways:  the mobilization 
of additional younger voters especially for Labour and the challenging of the 
mainstream media agenda and more specifically newspaper attacks on Labour and 
Corbyn. Reflecting on the outcome of the election, Corbyn himself expressed little 
doubt about the importance of social media:  
 …whilst a number of the print media were incredibly hostile to Labour… 
in reality social media has far greater reach… Those who follow Twitter, 
Facebook, Snapchat and so on really helped to get the message across and 
it certainly resulted in the voter registration that was so important… (Daly, 
2017) 
 
 
There is plenty of circumstantial evidence that social media driven campaigning 
facilitated the turnout of younger voters and helped with some surprise results.  In the 
case of voter registration, certainly social media played a role in targeting harder to 
reach younger people. The formal registration drive conducted by the Electoral 
Commission used social media extensively, even joining forces with Snapchat to 
launch a geofilter entitled “Find Your Voice”. However, importantly, it was not only 
the usual formal political channels promoting voter registration but a host of sources, 
including: celebrity videos; citizen initiatives such as Rize-up.org; a crowd-funded 
registration project from online campaign group 38 Degrees; as well as numerous 
local reminders from Universities and colleges. Labour underpinned this by 
consistently urging people to register to vote – mentioned in all Corbyn’s rallies. In 
contrast, strikingly, the Conservatives only sent a single social media appeal to vote.  
In addition to a registration boost, one prominent argument that surfaced after 
the campaign was how social media was becoming an increasingly influential 
alternative to mainstream media. A YouGov survey sheds some perspective on the 
supposed social media - mainstream media divide. It provided evidence of 
generational shifts in media consumption and of the increasing influence of social 
media amongst 18-24 year olds. A range of social media outlets have now become 
popular with young adults as regular news sources (notably, Facebook, Twitter and 
Buzzfeed). These are already more important than magazines and newspapers (with 
the exception of the Guardian). Startlingly, not a single 18-24 year old in the survey 
saw local papers as regular news sources. Nevertheless, mainstream BBC News 
remains by far and away the most dominant source for all age groups. Similarly, 
television is seen as the most influential media on vote choice; although for 18-24 
year olds, it is closely followed by social media. All age groups believe that the digital 
age has diminished the influence of newspapers, but the press remains important for 
those over 40 (Mayhew, 2017c; YouGov, 2017). 
 
Conclusion 
Despite the growth in popularity of social media, mainstream media is not yet 
politically redundant. Television, particularly BBC News, remains hugely important 
for all ages. The divide between MSM (especially TV) and social media is somewhat 
of an artificial one.  Mainstream media events such as the set-piece interviews (like 
Neil on the BBC and Ridge on Sky), leaders’ television appearances (The One Show) 
and the formal leadership debates were all important in shaping social media 
discussion. Rather than being parallel universes, the digital sphere and mainstream 
media increasingly overlapped and fed off one another in this campaign. Nevertheless, 
there is little doubt that Labour capitalised on the reach of social media into their 
target audience of young and new voters. It marks the first time in the UK that social 
media was properly at the heart of a party election campaign. It has been noted for 
some time that Internet works best for the swift mobilisation of oppositionist 
movements that fitted well with the reinvigorated grassroots networks of Corbyn’s 
Labour Party.  
The Conservatives lacked both the leader and the messages to engage and 
enthuse audiences online or off. Perhaps even more crucially, they lacked the 
energized digital networks to share and spread their message. The continued decline 
of the party’s membership base and its ageing nature suggest that this structural 
disadvantage is unlikely to disappear soon (Chadwick, 2017). However, Labour’s 
success in both overcoming press hostility and dominating social media platforms still 
didn’t deliver victory. Moreover, in an era where support and partisanship need to be 
constantly maintained and rebuilt, Labour cannot automatically expect to maintain 
this advantage nor would the oppositional movement type approach necessarily work 
if they were to gain office in the near future. As Charles (2017) noted, the rise of 
social media means the only certainty is to expect the unexpected. 
 
References 
 
Al-Kadhi, A. (2017) “Forget the social media bubble – we made sure that our voices 
were heard at this election’, The Independent, 9 June.  
Anstead, N. (2017) “Data-driven campaigning in the 2015 UK general election”. The 
International Journal of Press/Politics. 22 (3), 294-313.  
Bauchowitz, S. and M. Hanska, (2017) “How the General Election is Shaping up on 
Twitter” Blogs LSE, 5 June, Blogs.lse.ac.uk/2017/06/05/how-the-general-election-
2017-is-shaping-up-on-twitter 
Booth, R and A. Hern (2017) “Labour won social media election, digital strategists 
say”. The Guardian, 9 June. 
BBC (2017) ‘Theresa May says no to general election debates’, BBC News, 19th 
April, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-39633696. 
Blackledge, S. (2017) ‘ “Three minutes of nothing”: Herald reporter reflects on PM 
encounter’, The Herald, 31st May http://www.plymouthherald.co.uk/three-minutes-of-
nothing-herald-reporter-reflects-on-pm-encounter/story-30363961-detail/story.html. 
Cecil, N. (2017) “How Jeremy Corbyn beat Theresa May in the Social Media Election 
War”. Evening Standard, 14 June.  
Chadwick, A. (2017) “Corbyn, Labour, digital media and the 2017 UK election” in 
Thorsen, E., Jackson, D. and D. Lilleker (eds) UK Election Analysis 2017, 
p.89.http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/29374/10/UKElectionAnalysis2017_Thorsen-
Jackson-and-Lilleker_v1.pdf. 
Chakelian, A. (2017) “Armchair activists or mass mobilisers? How Momentum is 
shaping Labour’s campaign”. New Statesman, 16 May. 
Charles, A. (2017) “All lols and trolls”, in Thorsen, et al. (eds), idem, p.102. 
Coleman, S. (2017) ‘Ducking the Debate’, in Thorsen, et al. (eds) idem, p.43. 
Crace, J. (2017) ‘The making of the Maybot: a year of mindless slogans, U-turn and 
denials’, The Guardian, 10th July 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jul/10/making-maybot-theresa-may-rise-
and-fall. 
Cram, L., Llewellyn, C. Hill, R. and W. Magdy (2017) “General Election 2017: A 
Twitter Analysis”. Neuropolitics Research Lab, School of Political and Social Science 
University of Edinburgh. http://blogs.sps.ed.ac.uk/neuropolitics/ 
Daily Mail (2017a) ‘Crush the Saboteurs’, Daily Mail, 19 April. 
Daily Mail (2017b) ‘Apologists for Terror, Daily Mail, 7 June. 
Daly, R. (2017) “Jeremy Corbyn says social media was a big part in Labour’s election 
support”. New Musical Express, 25 June.  www.nme.com/tag/general-election-2017. 
Deacon D, Downey J, Stanyer J, and Wring D. (2015) ‘Media Coverage of the UK 
General Election 2015’, Report 5, May.  Loughborough: Loughborough University 
Centre for Research in Communication and Culture 
http://blog.lboro.ac.uk/crcc/general-election/media-coverage-of-the-2015-campaign-
report-5/. 
Deacon D., Downey J., Smith D., Stanyer J, and Wring D. (2017a) ‘Media Coverage 
of the 2017 General Election’, Report 4, June.  Loughborough: Loughborough 
University Centre for Research in Communication and Culture 
http://blog.lboro.ac.uk/crcc/general-election/media-coverage-of-the-2017-general-
election-campaign-report-4/. 
Deacon D., Downey J., Smith D., Stanyer J, and Wring D. (2017b) ‘Two parts policy, 
one part process: News media coverage of the 2017 Election’, in Mair, J. et al. (eds.) 
Brexit, Trump and the Media.  London: Abramis, 367-71. 
Fletcher, R. (2017) “Labour’s social media campaign: more post, more video, and 
more interaction” in Thorsen, et al. (eds) idem, p.92. 
Gibson, R. (2013). “Party Change, Social Media and the Rise of ‘Citizen-initiated’ 
Campaigning”. Party Politics, 21,183-197. 
Gwynne, A. (2017) “Theresa May called a snap election, but we in Labour had 
Snapchat. No contest”. Guardian, 15 June. 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jun/15/theresa-may-snap-election-
labour-snapchat-campaigning  
Kaminska, M., Gallacher, J.D., Yasseri, T. and P.N. Howard (2017) “Social Media 
and News Sources during the 2017 UK General Election”.  Data Memo, 5 June, 
Oxford Internet Institute. http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/sites/89/2017/06/Social-Media-and-News-Sources-during-the-2017-
UK-General-Election.pdf 
LBC (2017) “Tory candidate creates worst political video ever”. LBC.co.uk, 6 June. 
http://www.lbc.co.uk/politics/elections/general-election-2017/tory-candidate-creates-
worst-political-video-ever/  
Littunen, M. (2017) “An analysis of news and advertising in the UK general election”. 
Open Democracy UK, 7 June, https://www.opendemocracy.net/uk/analysis-of-news-
and-advertising-in-uk-general-election. 
Mason, A. (2017) “Election Reflections: We must embrace new technologies or we 
will be left behind”. Conservative Home, 2 July. 
https://www.conservativehome.com/platform/2017/07/adrian-mason-election-
reflections-we-must-embrace-new-technology-or-we-will-be-left-behind.html  
Mayhew, F. (2017a) ‘Print ABCs’, Press Gazette, 15th June, 
http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/print-abc-metro-overtakes-sun-in-uk-weekday-
distribution-but-murdoch-title-still-britains-best-selling-paper/. 
Mayhew, F. (2017b) ‘Website ABCs’, Press Gazette, 15th June, 
http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/website-abcs-general-election-campaign-boost-sees-
independent-sun-and-birmingham-mail-double-daily-browsers/  
Mayhew, F. (2017c) “Survey reveal the extent to which newspapers and social media 
influenced voting decisions at the 2017 general election”. Press Gazette, 31 July. 
www.Pressgazzette.co.uk/category/news/digital-journalism/social _media/  
Morgan (2017) “CCHQ must rebuild its digital strategy from the ground up”. 
Conservative Home, 14 July. 
https://www.conservativehome.com/platform/2017/07/richard-morgan-cchq-must-
rebuild-its-digital-strategy-from-the-ground-up.html  
Mortimer, C. (2017) ‘Theresa May savaged by party leaders for debate no-show: 
“Good leaders don’t run away”’, Independent, 31 May 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-election-debate-attacked-
corbyn-tim-farron-caroline-lucas-good-leaders-dont-run-away-a7766121.html. 
Oborne, P. (2005) ‘Election Unspun: Why Politicians Can’t Tell the Truth’, Channel 
4, 25th April. 
Order-Order (2017) “UKIP order candidates to close down social media sites”. 20 
March. https://order-order.com/2017/03/20/ukip-order-candidates-to-close-social-
media-accounts/  
Parry, K. (2017) ‘Seeing Jeremy Corbyn and not seeing Theresa May: the promise of 
civic leadership’, in Thorsen, et al. (eds) idem, p.124. 
Payne, S. (2017) ‘General Election: Theresa May seizes the moment to bank poll 
lead’, FT.com, 18 April https://www.ft.com/content/7ef72c62-2425-11e7-a34a-
538b4cb30025. 
Poletti, M., Bale, T and Webb P. (2016) “Explaining the pro-Corbyn surge in Labour 
Membership”, 16 November, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/explaining-the-
pro-corbyn-surge-in-labours-membership/ 
Ponsford, D. (2017) ‘UK newspaper website ABCs for April 2017’, Press Gazette, 18 
May http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/uk-newspaper-website-abcs-for-april-2017-no-
sign-of-snap-general-election-traffic-boost/. 
Pringle, B. (2017) “why Labour’s social media influencer strategy is working”. The 
Drum, 31 May.  
Savage, M and A Hucillo (2017) “How Jeremy Corbyn turned a youth surge into 
votes”. Guardian, 10 June. 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/10/jeremy-corbyn-youth-surge-votes-
digital-activists . 
Scammell, M. (2017) ‘”Theresa May for Britain”: a personal brand in search of 
personality’, in Thorsen, et al. (eds), idem, p.130. 
Segesten, A.D. and M. Bossetta, (2017) “Sharing is caring: Labour supporters use of 
social media” in Thorsen, et al. (eds), idem, p.91. 
Shabi, R. (2017) “What use is a group of cultish, Corbynista clicktivists? Quite a lot, 
actually”. The Guardian, 1 June 2017.  
Shaw, S. (2017) ‘Meeting the public: the perils and pitfalls of “walkabout” questions 
to Theresa May in GE2017’, in Thorsen, et al. (eds), idem, p.32 
The Economist, (2017) “How online campaigning is influencing Britain’s election’. 
27 May. www.economist.com/news/britain/21722690-social-media-allow-parties-
target-voters-tailored-messagesand-cat-videos-how-online  
The Sun (2017a) ‘The Sun Says: Deadly Disgrace’, The Sun, 23 May. 
Thorsen, E., D. Jackson, and D Lilleker (eds) UK Election Analysis 2017: Media, 
Voters and the Campaign. Centre for the Study of Journalism, Culture and 
Community, Bournemouth University. 
Turner, G. and J. Kahn (2017) ‘UK Labour’s savvy use of social media helped win 
young voters”. Bloomberg, 11 June. 
Walsh, M. (2017) “the alternate and influential world of the political parties’ 
Facebook feeds” in Thorsen, et al. (eds) UK Election Analysis 2017, pp.96-97. 
Ward, S.J., Gibson, R.K., and M. Cantijoch, (2018). 'Digital Campaigning'. In Fisher, 
J., Fieldhouse, E., Franklin, M.N., Gibson, R.K., Wlezien, C. and M. Cantijoch (eds) 
The Routledge Handbook of Public Opinion and Voting Behaviour, Routledge, 
London, (forthcoming).  
Waterson, J. (2017) ‘Corbyn’s Media Gamble: The Labour Leader Has Ditched 
Newspaper Journalists in the Campaign Trail’, Buzzfeed, 4 May 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/jimwaterson/jeremy-corbyn-has-ditched-newspaper-
journalists-on-the?utm_term=.mx4lkXrro#.uqGzN0JJ8. 
Wendling, M. (2017) “Was it Facebook wot swung it?” BBC Trending, 10 June.  
Wring, D. and S.J. Ward (2015) “Exit Velocity: The Media Election” Parliamentary 
Affairs, 68 (supple), 224-240. 
 
